2:00 PM, JUNE 26 2013
The Errors of Edward Snowden and His Global
Hypocrisy Tour
by Kurt Eichenwald
[Well at least Bradley Manning did it to
show off for his tranny boyfriend.]
My tolerance for Edward
Snowden
has run out.
The former contractor with the National Security
Agency who divulged classified secrets about domestic surveillance programs has
undertaken what can only be depicted as the global hypocrisy tour. A man
outraged by American surveillance and who advocates free expression toodles
happily to Hong Kong, a special administrative region of China? Then off to
Moscow? Then tries for Ecuador (and, in some accounts, Cuba)?
And along the way, Eddie decided to toss out
classified information about foreign-intelligence surveillance by the United
States in other countries. For the Chinese, he was quite a spigot of secrets. He revealed documents showing that
the N.S.A. had obtained text messages from the Chinese by hacking into some of
the country’s telecommunications networks, engaged in computer espionage activities
at Tsinghua University, and hacked into systems of Pacnet, an Asian provider of
global telecommunications service.
Now, before I get into the specifics of Snowden’s
China leaks, I want to stop for a minute. I know that, from the time he
disclosed classified documents about the mass collection of Americans’
telecommunications data, there have been plenty of debates about whether
Snowden is a whistle-blower or a traitor. And I can understand that
disagreement when it comes to the data-mining program that slurps up e-mail and
phone data of American citizens. But what, exactly, is Snowden attempting to
prove with his China revelations? That countries engage in espionage? That the
United States listens in on communications of countries with which it maintains
often tense and occasionally volatile relations?
The existence of electronic espionage seems to be
his beef. In an interview with the South China Morning Post—in
which he admitted that he took a job as a systems administrator with an N.S.A.
consultant, Booz Allen Hamilton, for the purpose of stealing classified
documents—Snowden laid out his bizarre and egomaniacal philosophy: he would
decide what information to pass on in countries around the world.
“If I have time to go
through this information, I would like to make it available to journalists in
each country to make their own assessment, independent of my bias, as to
whether or not the knowledge of US network operations against their people
should be published.”
I’ll have to assume that Snowden is on this fit of
self-righteous arrogance because he thinks there is something wrong with what
he’s seen of United States surveillance in other countries. But to decide that
standard espionage activities are improper is a foolish, ahistorical belief.
N.S.A. surveillance has been beneficial repeatedly
in American foreign policy. Although most instances remain secret, we already
know that the N.S.A. listened to Soviet pilots during the 1983 shooting down of
a South Korean airliner; used intercepted diplomatic messages to track a 1986
Berlin disco bombing to Libya; and used the cell phones’ SIM cards to track
terrorist suspects after the 9/11 attacks.
But let’s take a more important example. In 1937—at a time when the United States
was declaring neutrality in the emerging global tensions that fueled World War
II—the Japanese government created a cipher for its military messages using a
device called the “97-shiki O-bun In-ji-ki.” The Americans code-named it
“Purple.”
The United States military was able to intercept
Japanese communications (the very reason that Tokyo needed a code) but couldn’t
decrypt the information sent through the Purple machine. William Friedman, the
first American cryptography expert who tried to break the code, made some
progress before suffering a nervous breakdown. Using that initial information,
others managed to break more of the code. Once cracked, the United States could
track Japanese naval-troop movements and even intercepted communications
containing plans for the Pearl Harbor attack—information that was not properly
used.
Would Snowden have been outraged that the United
States was intercepting Japanese data at a time when the countries were not at
war? It took years to crack the Purple code—would Snowden think the United
States should have waited until after Pearl Harbor to tap into Japanese
communication lines, and only then begin the arduous effort to break the code?
And if not, then what is his point in turning over these kinds of secrets to
the Chinese? All I have to say is, thank God Snowden was not around in 1937,
four years before the United States joined the war—Lord knows how many
Americans would have died if he had acted with whatever arrogance, or
self-righteousness, or narcissism, or pure treasonous beliefs that drove him to
his espionage on behalf of the Chinese.
Now for a closer look at the specific details
Snowden turned over. In trying to understand this, I reached out to an
individual I know who spent much of a lifetime in the intelligence world,
including some related to parts of Asia. While he specifically stated that
nothing he discussed would be based on classified information, he was able to
offer a number of educated explanations why the United States would be involved
in the activities in China that Snowden revealed.
Take the actions involving Tsinghua University.
There are many reasons the N.S.A. would be interested in communications and
computer activities at this Beijing-based school. For example, beginning in the
past decade or so, university programs on arms control have played an important
role in the Chinese government’s efforts to administer export controls on
sensitive items. (For those wishing to know more, this is well detailed in a
book published by the Rand Corporation called Chasing the Dragon:
Assessing China’s System of Export Controls for WMD-Related Goods and
Technologies.) Now, perhaps the most prominent university program in China
on arms control is at—you guessed it—Tsinghua University. So, do you think
there might be a reason why the N.S.A. would want to know about any
communications on arms control that might take place between the Chinese
government and Tsinghua?
The importance of China in global arms-control
issues is hard to understate, even in American negotiations with Russia over
proposals on nuclear-arms reduction. As Richard
Weitz, a senior fellow and director of the Center for Political-Military
Affairs at Hudson Institute, wrote last year:
China’s continued
absence from strategic nuclear arms control negotiations is already impeding
U.S.-Russian progress in this area. Beijing has traditionally resisted
participating in formal nuclear arms control agreements. . . . Whereas U.S.
officials want the next major nuclear arms reduction agreement to include only
Russia and the United States, Russian negotiators want China and other nuclear
weapons states to participate. In particular, Russian representatives insist
they cannot reduce their
major holdings of nonstrategic, or tactical, nuclear weapons without
considering China’s growing military potential. Involving China in certain
U.S.-Russian arms control processes could facilitate progress between Moscow
and Washington in these areas and yield ancillary benefits for related issues.
[Just this week (6/25/13) the Russians
started a series of tests of a new model missile of this class.]
Is this the reason for the N.S.A.’s activities at
Tsinghua? My intel friend held it out as a good, educated guess, but then made
a broader point. Contrary to the depictions in movies, the N.S.A. does
not engage in foreign surveillance as part of some James Bond–ian plot to take
over the world. Decisions are based on the national-security needs of the
United States. Actions at Tsinghua are not arbitrary; there is a
national-security reason they are being done, whether about arms-control
policies in China, something else altogether, or both.
As for the N.S.A. gaining access to Pacnet, the best
answer is: no kidding. Snowden has expressed seeming outrage both at this and
at the fact that Britain, through the Government Communications Headquarters,
had tapped into undersea fiber-optic cables. Pacnet operates EAC-C2C—the
leading fiber-optic submarine cable network in Asia, connecting Hong Kong,
China, Korea, Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, and Singapore. In other words,
international communications between Asian nations have a good chance of going
through the Pacnet cables.
And, what apparently shocks Snowden but what any
fool has known for years, the advent of fiber-optic technology has required the
N.S.A. and other allied intelligence services to get into the business of
cable-tapping. They had the choice: either tap cables or, in some fit of
childish, Snowden-like horror at the demands of international security
operations, surrender access to intelligence that the West has depended on for
decades.
This problem was
discussed in a top-secret, hush-hush, “no one can ever see it” public report by
the Congressional Research Service on—get ready—January 16, 2001. This
12-year-old document explains not only the reason for expanded
international surveillance, but also the need to tap cables:
In the past decade, two
important trends have combined to change the nature of electronic surveillance
efforts. The end of the Cold War meant policymakers and military officials had
a wider range of countries that they were concerned with and placed much
greater emphasis on “non-state actors”—terrorist groups and narcotics smuggling
organizations that have come to be seen as genuine national security threats.
These links are not necessarily easy targets given the great expansion in
international telephone service that has grown by approximately 18% annually
since 1992. Intelligence agencies are faced with profound
“needle-in-a-haystack” challenges; it being estimated that in 1997 there were
some 82 billion minutes of telephone service worldwide. The technologies used
in civilian communications circuits have also changed; in the past decade
reliance on microwave transmissions (which can be intercepted with relative
efficiency) has been increasingly displaced by fiber optic cables. Fiber optics
can carry far more circuits with greater clarity and through longer distances
and provides the greater bandwidth necessary for
transmitting the enormous quantities of data commonplace in the Internet age.
Inevitably, fiber optic transmissions present major challenges to electronic
surveillance efforts as their contents cannot be readily intercepted, at least
without direct access to the cables themselves.
Please note, this document is pre-9/11, from a
government analytical group outside of the intelligence agencies, discussing
the need to tap cables for the purpose of aiding in the surveillance of
terrorist groups and narcotics smugglers. (Asia, anyone?) This is not some
excuse for what was done in the aftermath of the al-Qaeda attacks in New York
and Washington.
But the most important sentence in this report is
this: Intelligence agencies are faced with profound
“needle-in-a-haystack” challenges. And that is the point of all of
this Snowden-esque controversy. In the past, it was comparatively easy to snap
up national-security intel—set up a microwave interception system targeting
Soviet officials and agents, or some such. America could identify those who
posed the national-security threat. Now, not so much.
To hunt for needles, the N.S.A. needs a global
haystack that can be used for data mining. That is what the data collection is
all about; no one has any interest in listening in on innocuous calls or
reading pointless e-mails. This is all about using computers—massive, massive
computers—and using complex models and algorithms to find the needles, rather
than hoping to guess how to keep Americans safe, just in case the Ed Snowdens
of the world might get upset with more intelligent approaches.
Which brings us back to Snowden’s global hypocrisy
tour. I think nothing has more thoroughly damaged Snowden’s “whistle-blower”
persona than his bizarre—and, I would say, cowardly—decision to rely on some of
the countries with the greatest history of oppression to help keep him out of
the American’s hands. (Usually, when people engage in civil disobedience for a
cause—which Snowden seems to want people to believe he is doing—they accept the
punishment that will accompany their decision. Snowden, instead, has acted like
a spy, fleeing to countries with deeply strained relationships with the United
States.
The irony of someone purportedly dedicated to
privacy and human rights aiding the Chinese government grew even starker while
Snowden was in Hong Kong. Last week, Human Rights Watch issued a report condemning a massive surveillance
campaign undertaken by the Chinese government in Tibetan villages, which
results in political re-education of those who may question the Communist
regime and the establishment of partisan security units. “These tactics
discriminate against those perceived as potentially disloyal, and restrict
their freedom of religion and opinion,” Human Rights Watch wrote.
But hey, that’s just real life, not the Internet
privacy that concerns Snowden. And, of course, the level of the Chinese
government’s surveillance and control of their citizens’ use of the Internet is
almost an art form. Just six months ago, China’s legislative body, the Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress, adopted the “Decision to
Strengthen the Protection of Online Information.” The new rules, which Human
Rights Watch says “threaten security and privacy of internet users,” require
telecommunications providers to collect reams of personal information about
customers who sign up for Internet, landline, or cell-phone service. The law
also requires for the providers to insure they have the ability to immediately
identify the real names of people who post comments under pseudonyms. Guess
why? “In the days following the decision,’’ Human Rights Watch reported,
“several well-known online activists found that their weibo micro-blogging
accounts had been shut down.’’
As for Russia, the crackdown on public activism has
intensified in recent months, which, again, has led to Human Rights Watch issuing a report just a few weeks before Snowden
landed in Moscow. “The crackdown is threatening civil society,” said Hugh Williamson,
Europe and Central Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “The EU has spoken out
strongly in recent months, but now is the time to directly call on Russia’s
leadership to revise restrictive laws and stop the harassment of independent
groups.” Primarily, the Russians are going after hundreds of rights groups and
related activist organizations as part of a massive campaign to force them to
register as foreign agents. “The authorities are seeking to define ‘political’
so broadly as to make any involvement in public life that is not controlled by
the government off-limits,” Williamson said. “They are also trying to tarnish
groups with the ‘foreign agents’ label, which in Russia can only mean ‘spy.’”
And what about Ecuador? Why, just two weeks ago, this country that is apparently on Snowden’s
list of possible future homes passed new rules that impede free expression. The
statute, called the Communications Law, prohibits anyone from disseminating
information through the media that might undermine the prestige or credibility
of a person or institution (you know, like revealing a government-sponsored
surveillance program). The law also places burdens on journalists, making them
subject to civil or criminal penalties for publishing information that serves
to undermine the security of the state (you know, like revealing a
government-sponsored surveillance program).
The takeaway from all of this is perplexing. Perhaps
Snowden is so impaired by his tunnel vision about America’s espionage
techniques that he doesn’t understand he has made himself an international fool
by cozying up to some of the world’s less-admirable regimes on issues of human
rights. And there is another thing to bear in mind: Since Snowden seems keen on
turning over secret American information to repressive governments, will he be,
in the end, acting to aid that repression? Will whatever information he yields
be the missing thread that these authoritarian governments need to oppress
their citizens more?
I don’t know. Neither do you. And, in the most
horrible reality of all, neither does Edward Snowden.