Saturday, September 14, 2013

Rolling Stone’s Portrait of an Affable Psychopath

Posted By Neo Neocon On July 21, 2013 @ 12:15 am at PJMedia

Much of the brouhaha about Rolling Stone’s piece on Dzhokhar Tsarnaev has centered on the rockstar-style photo of the bomber on the cover.





But that’s not the only thing wrong with the article. Take the text [1], which is an earnest attempt to answer the question: How could a good boy like Dzhokhar go so bad? What secret sorrow, what family troubles or school troubles or other troubles led a young man universally described as unusually charming, magnetic, easygoing, laid-back, cool, and happy-go-lucky to become an Islamic terrorist murderer?

The article fails abysmally to answer the question, although along the way it offers quite a bit of background information about the boy and then the young man it refers to as Jahar, as most of his friends did. But perhaps the author is asking the wrong question. Maybe there’s not that much to explain or understand, if one considers the possibility that the charismatic Dzohkhar may in fact be a psychopath.

How could that be? Despite a common popular misconception that psychopaths are a gloomy sort, not the type of people you’d take to if you were to meet them, that doesn’t really describe the majority of them. The classic text on the subject, The Mask of Sanity [2], was written in 1941 by psychiatrist Hervey Cleckley. That’s a long time ago, but the work holds up very well today because although we can describe psychopathy, we have learned very little more about its etiology than was known in Cleckley’s time. Here’s his description of the psychopath’s “mask”:

…[T]he [psychopath's] central personality…[is] covered over by…a perfect mask of genuine sanity, a flawless surface indicative in every respect of robust mental health. .. [T]hose called psychopaths are very sharply characterized by the lack of anxiety (remorse, uneasy anticipation, apprehensive scrupulousness, the sense of being under stress or strain)…

It is my opinion that when the typical psychopath…occasionally commits a major deed of violence, it is usually a casual act done not from tremendous passion or as a result of plans persistently followed with earnest compelling fervor. There is less to indicate excessively violent rage than a relatively weak emotion breaking through even weaker restraints.

Reading Cleckley, and then reading the Rolling Stone piece, one can’t help but be struck by the similarity between his friends’ descriptions of Dzhokhar and Cleckley’s descriptions of psychopaths. Many of Dzhokhar’s friends were deeply puzzled by the cool, chill, laid-back Jahar’s participation in the bombing, and theorized that his more conventionally depressed, angry, and jihadi brother Tamerlan must have “turned” him or controlled or brainwashed him in some way to have accounted for Dzhokhar’s going along with such a violent and cold-blooded act.

Most people would find it hard to believe that Tamerlan, the more ideologically motivated of the pair, could really just say to his brother, “Hey, want to help me bomb people at the marathon?” and that Dzhokhar would say, “Sure, why not?” But if one studies psychopaths, it is much easier to see how that could really be the case. There is no need to postulate some sort of terrible psychological trauma for Dzhokhar, nor any particularly deep influence or mysterious control Tamerlan had over him, if Dzhokhar is a psychopath. It may have just seemed like a good idea to Dzhokhar at the time, and he had no inner core of morality to stop him.

More from Cleckley:

More often than not, the typical psychopath will seem particularly agreeable and make a distinctly positive impression when he is first encountered. Alert and friendly in his attitude, he is easy to talk with and seems to have a good many genuine interests. … More than the average person, he is likely to seem free from social or emotional impediments, from the minor distortions, peculiarities, and awkwardness so common even among the successful.

And from the Rolling Stone article:

…[A]fter several months of interviews with friends, teachers and coaches still reeling from the shock, what emerges is a portrait of a boy who glided through life, showing virtually no signs of anger, let alone radical political ideology or any kind of deeply felt religious beliefs.

We don’t know the cause of psychopathy. But whatever it is, it seems present very early in life and is a defect in the moral and empathic senses. The result can be a killer who is able to hide an utter lack of regard for other human beings behind a facade of facile con artist charm, adept at sensing what other people want to hear and delivering it. When such a person meets up and partners with a needier, angrier, more sincerely doctrinaire, and more conventionally motivated sidekick (such as brother Tamerlan), a sinister synergy is born.

Note also the casual, nose-thumbing malevolence of actions of Dzhokhar’s such as these post-attack [3] tweets of his. How could someone be so strangely distant from the dire consequences of his own acts? How to square it with his seeming sweetness and affability? More from Cleckley:

It is not necessary to assume great cruelty or conscious hatred in [the psychopath] commensurate with the degree of suffering he deals out to others. … In [human life] he seems to find nothing deeply meaningful or persistently stimulating, but only some transient and relatively petty pleasant caprices, a terribly repetitious series of minor frustrations, and ennui. …[H]e suggests a man hanging from a ledge who knows if he lets go he will fall…who, furthermore, is not very tired and who knows help will arrive in a few minutes, but who nevertheless, with a charming smile and a wisecrack, releases his hold to light a cigarette, to snatch at a butterfly, or just to thumb his nose at a fellow passing on the street below.

…Having no major goals or incentives, he may be prompted by simple tedium to acts of folly or crime. Such prompting is not opposed by ordinary compunction or concern for consequences.

From Rolling Stone again:

At his arraignment at a federal courthouse in Boston on July 10th, Jahar smiled, yawned, slouched in his chair and generally seemed not to fully grasp the seriousness of the situation, while pleading innocent to all charges. At times he seemed almost to smirk –

There was probably no “almost” about it.

“Listen,” says Payack [the high school wrestling coach], “there are kids we don’t catch who just fall through the cracks, but this guy was seamless, like a billiard ball. No cracks at all….I knew this kid, and he was a good kid,” Payack says, sadly. “And, apparently, he’s also a monster.”

Payack only thinks he knew him, although he can be forgiven for his error. After all, he only knew the mask, as did virtually everyone else Dzhokhar encountered, right up to the moment the bombs went off.

“He was just superchill,” says another friend, Will…

“He was smooth as f—,” says his friend Alyssa, who is a year younger than Jahar…

For all of their city’s collective angst and community processing and resolutions of being “one Cambridge,” the reality is that none of Jahar’s friends had any idea he was unhappy, and they really didn’t know he had any issues in his family other than, perhaps, his parents’ divorce, which was kind of normal.

Maybe they should read The Mask of Sanity. It would teach them a lot more about psychopathy than the Cambridge schools ever did.

Article printed from PJ Media: http://pjmedia.com

URL to article: http://pjmedia.com/blog/the-affable-psychopath/

URLs in this post:

[1] Take the text: http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/jahars-world-20130717

[2] The Mask of Sanity: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Mask_of_Sanity


[3] these post-attack: http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/boston-marathon-bombing-dzhokhar-tsarnaev-tweets-run-article-1.1322163

By CHRISTOPHER ORLET on 7.19.13 @ 6:07AM at PJMedia




Sherwood Anderson’s “The Egg” as a cautionary tale for hipsters.

It is my belief that a great deal of misery can be avoided by reading great literature. I, for one, have never had the slightest impulse to raise chickens, and for that I have Sherwood Anderson to thank. Anderson’s short story “The Egg” should be required reading for all would-be urban chicken ranchers:

One unversed in such matters can have no notion of the many and tragic things that can happen to a chicken. It is born out of an egg, lives for a few weeks as a tiny fluffy thing such as you will see pictured on Easter cards, then becomes hideously naked, eats quantities of corn and meal bought by the sweat of your … brow, gets diseases called pip, cholera, and other names, stands looking with stupid eyes at the sun, becomes sick and dies. A few hens, and now and then a rooster, intended to serve God’s mysterious ends, struggle through to maturity. The hens lay eggs out of which come other chickens and the dreadful cycle is thus made complete. It is all unbelievably complex.

For a decade or so this complexity has been a popular pastime of urban Do-It-Yourselfers. Not content with a cabbage patch and a few carrots and maybe some marijuana plants in the attic, DIY’ers crave the full agricultural experience. Since raising cattle and hogs on inner city streets is out of the question, poultry must suffice. What could be easier? Build a little coop in the back yard, throw down some corn in the morning and sit back and think about all the money you’re saving, all that sustainable food grown in a humane manner, all while basking in the warm, fuzzy glow of self-sufficiency.

Here’s where I turn into a wet blanket. Turns out that the “pets that make you breakfast” aren’t pets at all. They are livestock, and, as every child who has read Charlotte’s Web knows, one must be willing to butcher one’s livestock. What’s more, it is hard to sex chickens, so when you order a bird online you cannot be guaranteed you are getting a hen and not a rooster. And many cities ban roosters because they are considered too noisy. Turns out with all the pit bulls, jackhammers, weedwackers, leaf blowers, hip hop music, garbage trucks, rush hour traffic, and incessant sirens, your neighbors are most likely to complain about a few cock-a-doodle-dos.

Turns out hens only lay eggs for about two years, but can live as long as a decade. Who knew? I didn’t, until I came across a magazine piece about fair-weather farmers dumping hundreds of yard birds on animal shelters. Nationwide, urban animal shelters are reporting steep rises in their chicken populations. Suddenly the urban farmers, who probably laughed at the high school kids that joined Future Farmers of America, find themselves stuck with dozens of noisy, expensive, dirty, spent hens. A country girl would not see this as a problem. She would see this as a solution to Sunday’s dinner. But urban farmers are notoriously squeamish. While the thought of eating a chicken seems palatable, the thought of killing one’s hen seems like something a Republican would do.





CRITICS BLAME THE locavore movement for the unwanted birds. Locavores respond that Americans — especially conservatives — talk a great game about tradition, small business, small farming, and rugged individualism, but write off those who indulge in traditional practices as suffering from a misplaced rural nostalgia.

Put me down with the locavores. The fact is our small towns and small farms are vanishing. If there is too much rural nostalgia, which I doubt, it certainly hasn’t led to a rush from the cities and suburbs to the countryside. It hasn’t led to the best and brightest of small town America returning home after college to settle. As for buying locally, as a family that buys local produce at a farmer’s market, I can report that the sweet corn we buy from the farmer in nearby East Carondelet tastes like butter, and the small sweet strawberries we buy from the Kruse farm in nearby Columbia taste like real strawberries, and not like the giant, red waxy things produced, frozen, and shipped in from California.


But as Sherwood Anderson would tell you, poultry is another matter. Cities probably meant well when they began allowing city dwellers to raise chickens in their backyards. But gardens are one thing. Livestock is another. Animal husbandry is best left to the professionals.
Al Sharpton, Posh Populist

NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE JULY 19, 2013 12:00 AM

Living large among the 1 percenters.

By Jonah Goldberg

If Tom Wolfe were writing The Bonfire of the Vanities today, he’d need a scene in the Grand Havana Room in New York City. It’s an Olympian den fit for what Wolfe called the “Masters of the Universe” — the super-rich gods of finance who today go by the name “the 1 percent.” Taking up the penthouse floor of 666 Fifth Avenue, the Grand Havana Room is a private, invitation-only cigar club and four-star restaurant. Through its windows, you can see the toiling salary men 39 floors below as they scurry about like ants, some furtively smoking in doorways, ever fearful of Nanny Bloomberg’s All-Seeing Eye.

Named by Business Insider as one of the “11 exclusive clubs Wall Streeters are dying to get into,” the Grand Havana Room is where power brokers and celebrities hobnob with captains of industry in one of the last places where it’s still legal to smoke in the Big Apple.

Immune as I am to the seductions of class resentment and Jacobin envy, I will admit it: I love the place. If invited, and if I could afford it, I’d join.

The one question I have is: Who’s paying for Al Sharpton’s membership?

“The Rev” is an omnipresent member of the club. After his MSNBC show, he’ll swing by for dinner and cigars amid the other Masters of the Universe. I couldn’t confirm that he repaired there after he broadcast his radio show, Keeping It Real, from Zuccotti Park to show his solidarity with the 99-percenters.

The reason I ask who’s paying for his membership is that Sharpton’s relationship with money has always been complicated. When he claimed he didn't have the resources to pay damages in a defamation suit he lost, Sharpton was asked in a deposition how he could afford his suits. He didn't own them, he replied, someone else did. He was merely granted “access” to the garments as needed. The same went for his TV, silverware, etc.

There’s a metaphor in there somewhere. In our overly therapeutic culture, we talk a lot about “enabling” pathologies, self-destructive behavior, etc. Well, Sharpton is a pathology enabled by the very system he loathes.

In a healthy society, Sharpton might be on parole now — not the must-get guest for Meet the Press and Today on issues of racial justice. He was a ringleader in perpetuating the evil Tawana Brawley hoax, in which he and two corrupt lawyers (now disbarred) falsely accused assistant district attorney Steven Pagones and others of gang-raping a 15-year-old girl in a racist attack (Brawley claimed that she’d been smeared with feces and had had racist epithets written on her body). No person of any ideological stripe could doubt it was a fraud — except, that is, for the unrepentant Sharpton, who recently insisted “something happened.”

If he’d been locked up for that, he might not have helped incite the Crown Heights riots in 1991. After a tragic car accident in the New York neighborhood in which a Jewish driver accidentally struck and killed a black child named Gavin Cato, Sharpton stoked anti-Semitic rage. At the funeral for Cato, amid shouts from the crowd of “Heil Hitler!” (one banner read, “Hitler did not do the job”), Sharpton didn’t call for reconciliation; he inveighed against “diamond dealers.” During the riots Jews were beaten in the street, and eventually a Hasidic tourist from Australia, Yankel Rosenbaum, was stabbed to death.

Perhaps if Sharpton had been shunned for his role in that, he might not have encouraged yet more violence in 1995, when he led protests against the eviction of a black-owned record store. Sharpton fueled rage on his radio show and at rallies to the point where one of the protesters ran into a Jewish-owned store whose owner was wrongly blamed for the eviction, shot several people, and then burned the place down, killing seven (mostly Hispanic) occupants. [And his own damned self.]

But he was shunned for none of it. Nor was he shunned for his sometimes cavalier compliance with tax laws or his shabby shakedowns of corporations for donations. In fact, in a culture that increasingly rewards shamelessness, Sharpton got in on the ground floor and has been cashing in on his access ever since. The attorney general himself celebrates his “partnership” with Sharpton.

Sharpton is even hailed as an expert on racial tensions, which in a funny way is true. The establishment he constantly seeks to “speak truth” to has enabled him in every conceivable way. He doesn’t just have access to his suits, he’s been given access to just about everything the 1 percent has to offer, including the very best cigars.


— Jonah Goldberg is the author of the The Tyranny of Clichés, now on sale in paperback. You can write to him at goldbergcolumn@gmail.com, or via Twitter @JonahNRO. © 2013 Tribune Media Services, Inc.
Syria in a Nutshell

By  Victor Davis Hanson at NRO Sept. 13 2013

Tuesday, September 3, 2013

Obama's Tightrope Walk

By George Friedman in Stratfor Weekly TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 - 04:02 

Last week began with certainty that an attack on Syria was inevitable and even imminent. It ended with the coalition supporting the attack somewhere between falling apart and not coming together, and with U.S. President Barack Obama making it clear that an attack was inevitable, maybe in a month or so, if Congress approves, after Sept. 9 when it reconvenes. This is a comedy in three parts: the reluctant warrior turning into the raging general and finding his followers drifting away, becoming the reluctant warrior again. 

Begin with the fact that the United States was not the first country calling for military intervention in Syria after pictures of what appeared to be the dead from a chemical attack surfaced. That honor went to France, Turkey and Britain, each of whom called for action. Much as with Libya, where France and Italy were the first and most eager to intervene, the United States came late to the feast.

The United States did not have any overriding national interest in Syria.[1] It has been hostile for a long time to Assad's regime. It has sympathy for the Sunni insurgents but has drawn the conclusion that the collapse of Assad is not likely to lead to a democratic regime respecting human rights, but to an Islamist regime with links to al Qaeda. The United States is in the process of recovering from Iraq and Afghanistan, and is not eager to try its hand at nation building in Syria, especially given the players. Therefore the American attitude toward Syria has been to express deep concern while staying as far away as possible, much as the rest of the world has done.

What started to draw the United States into the matter was a statement made by the president in 2012, when he said that the use of chemical weapons would be a red line. He didn't mean he wanted to intervene. He set the red line because he figured that it was the one thing Assad wouldn't try. It was an attempt to stay out, not an announcement of interest. In fact, there had been previous evidence of small-scale chemical attacks, and the president had dodged commitment.

Washington's Human Rights Faction

This time, with major foreign partners demanding action, the president felt he had no choice. A significant faction pressed him on this in his foreign policy apparatus. There were those, like National Security Adviser Susan Rice, who favored the use of military force in the events of war crimes and human rights violations on a major scale. One would have thought that she would have supported the war in Iraq against Saddam Hussein, the epitome of war crimes and human rights violations, but she didn't, and that's another matter. The point is that, leaving Iraq, this faction felt that the United States failed to carry out its moral obligations in Rwanda, and applauded the intervention in Kosovo. 

This faction is not small and appeals to an important tendency in American political culture that sees World War II as the perfect war, because it was waged against an unspeakable evil, and not for strategic or material gain. That war was more complicated than that, but there was an element of truth to it. And the world, on the whole, approved of American involvement there. For them, this was the model of U.S. foreign policy. Secure behind distance and power, the United States ought not be a typical insecure political power, but should use its strength to prevent the more extreme injustices in the world. 

For them, the suffering in the Syrian civil war was the result of the repressiveness of the Assad regime. This faction had an interesting perspective. It focused on the current injustice, not always aware, interested or believing that what came later would be worse. I remember arguing with academic colleagues before the fall of the Shah that while he was certainly a thug, we and the Iranian people would regret what came next. There was a romantic belief that the crowd in the street was always more virtuous than the tyrant in his palace. Sometimes they were right. It is not clear that the fall of the Shah reduced the sum total of human suffering.

Throughout the Arab Spring [2] there has been a romanticizing of the crowd in the street, particularly when the crowd is seen through the lens of American exceptionalism. A belief was held, especially by those who saw the United States' primary responsibility as promoting human rights, that the majority of those in the streets wanted to create American-style democracy. Ironically, two groups that despise each other -- neo-conservatives and human rights activists -- took the same view: that if you eliminate tyrants, what would emerge would be constitutional democracies respecting human rights. Obama's Rice in 2013 assumed the same role as Bush's Paul Wolfowitz in 2003. 

Thus the removal of Assad became a foreign policy goal of the human rights faction deeply embedded in the ideology of the Obama administration. They were disappointed when, instead of intervening, he set the red line. When the red line appeared to be crossed, they pressed for action. 

Obama had learned a thing or two about the crowd, Arab and otherwise. He was far less romantic about their intent, particularly after Libya. After Libya he was also aware that after the self-congratulations, the United States would have to live with the chaos or new tyranny. He didn't want to attack, and that was clear in the first days after the affair.

There were two reasons. First, he had lost confidence in the crowd. Second, he had vowed not to go to war as Bush had, without international support validated by the United Nations, and with the burden of war leadership shared by other allies. In Libya the war started under French leadership, and over time the fact that the United States had the force needed and France didn't pushed the United States to the front, a position Obama didn't want to take again.

Pressed by the human rights faction in his administration to take action in Syria, he was also under pressure from three key countries: Britain, France and Turkey. Turkey in particular was important to him. Relations had been strained since 2003, when Turkey refused to let American troops attack Iraq from its soil. Agreeing to help in Turkey's call for intervention appealed to him, but not to the point where he was prepared to do more than a symbolic strike using only cruise missiles directed against uncertain targets, perhaps primarily missiles that could carry chemicals. Turkey demanded a Kosovo-type attack that was designed to loosen the regime's hold on the country. Obama resisted not the principle of attack but the scale Turkey wanted. 

The Reluctant Coalition Leader

Then something interesting happened. Over the course of the week, rather than the United States' following other countries call for action, Washington turned into the main advocate for intervention. The United States is the major global power. Its mere presence in the coalition focuses the coalition on the United States. In part, this is military; the United States has capabilities others don't. In part, it is political; the United States might be able to organize a global coalition while no one else can.

Obama was prepared, given his red line [3] and given pressure from key advisers, to participate in a coalition. He was, I think, surprised when the United States stopped being part of the coalition, but its leader and instigator, and then further, when others became disillusioned with its leadership. The whole idea had become his. He wasn't quite sure what to do with the honor. 

Then the British Parliament voted against going to war, and Prime Minister David Cameron, an advocate from the beginning, now had to bow out. The British had been part of wars the Americans had dreamed up. This was one that the British had helped concoct, and the parliament voted against it, with many parliament members saying the United Kingdom was no longer the Americans' lap dog. Obama, who had worked so hard to avoid leadership, had become George W. Bush to the British Parliament.

There was also behind the scenes diplomacy, as there always is. The focus was Russia. Russia had supported the Assad clan since Hafez al Assad's coup in 1970, when the Soviet Union supported the coup and the regime. Their relationships in Syria went back a long way, and the Soviet (now Russian) influence in Syria had been institutionalized on a personal and institutional level. The Russians were completely committed to the survival of the regime.

The United States was less passionate, but Obama, while willing to do the minimum gesture possible to satisfy his human rights impulse, did think about what would come later and didn't want to see the regime fall. In this, the Russians and Americans had common interests. 

During the week the president began focusing his attention on Bashar al Assad, holding him personally responsible for the chemical attack even if he didn't know of its planning and a junior officer had carried it out. His focus on Assad seemed to hint at a direction. If Assad and his closest supporters would step down, the regime could continue. The regime is a complex and enduring entity. It had survived two years of civil war. It was not simply a personal tyranny but a government with a lot of people with a stake in it. It would survive without him.

Getting rid of Assad and keeping the regime to block the jihadists would have been the best outcome in all of this. Of course while the Turks wanted more, the Russians didn't want any of it. They were building credibility through the Middle East and Eastern Europe based on American weakness, and they saw no reason to bail Obama out. He wasn't going to take the risks needed to take out the regime anyway.

The Russian calculations came down to its read of the United States, which is that it was not in a position to impose an international system in the region because of internal political weakness. Therefore the Russians had a rare opportunity to impose if not a system, then a presence. Most of all, the Russian view was that it had nothing to fear from the United States, in spite of its power imbalance. Obama was not likely to take action.

Others, like Poland, that had been with the Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan also bowed out. The Poles are interesting because they had been the most eager for collaboration with the Americans, but felt the most betrayed by not getting an American commitment for significant military aid and collaboration. They made it a point to tell the Americans that they would not support action in Syria -- not because they cared about Syria, but to show the consequences of American policy even to a relatively minor player. [And they’re still POed by Obama’s removal of anti-ballistic missile systems as a sop to the Russians, after all their sacrifice in the Sandbox.]

By the end of the week, the Russians were hurling insults at Obama, the British finally freed themselves from American domination, and the Turks were furious at American weakness. The French -- and France's interventionist flow is fascinating (Libya, Mali, now Syria) -- stood with the United States. This is a tale to consider in itself, but not here. And the Canadians decided that much as they disliked chemical weapons use, they would not be available. The wheels just came off the strategy.

The U.S. Dilemma

It is easy to blame Obama for losing control of the situation, but that is too simple. Every administration has its ideologues, and every president wants allies and no one wants to go to war without those allies flying aircraft beside them. And it would be nice if the United States could be just another country, but it isn't. The moment that it enters a coalition, it leads a coalition.

The United States had a strategic interest in neither faction taking power in Syria -- its Lebanonization. That is brutal, but it is true, and the United States was not the only country with that interest. It also ran against the grain of the administration's ideology and the passions of key members. The president tried to walk a tightrope between regime change and inaction (or a small action that left the regime in place). All of this is what presidents have to do.

The real problem is this: After the Islamist wars, the United States has, as happened before, sought to minimize its presence in the world and while enjoying the benefits of being the world's leading economy, not pay any political or military price for it. It is a strategy that is impossible to maintain, as the United States learned after World War I, Vietnam and Desert Storm. It is a seductive vision but a fantasy. The world comes a visiting.

Without a clear understanding of our strategy that goes beyond caution, it is impossible to clearly state the national interest or what things matter and what things don't. Syria didn't. But driven by an insufficient national strategy, the president was trapped by internal ideologies, the penchant of foreign allies and the temptation to do something, however ineffective. But as we know, the ineffective frequently becomes more expensive than the effective, and choosing where to be effective -- and where to pass -- is essential. 

This is not over yet. If Congress votes for strikes, it is likely that Obama will do something. But at that point he will be doing it by himself, and the inevitable death of innocents in even the smallest attack will bring him under fire from some of those most insistent that he do something about the war crimes in Syria. 

It is not easy to be president, nor is it easy to be the world's leading power. It is nice to be able to sit in moral judgment of men like Assad, but sadly not have the power to do anything. Where life gets hard is when sitting in moral judgment forces you to do something because you can. It teaches you to be careful in judging, as the world will both demand that you do something and condemn you for doing it.


[2] http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110815-re-examining-arab-spring

[3] http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/redlines-and-problems-intervention-syria

Friday, August 23, 2013

The Anti-Che
By  Jay Nordlinger AUGUST 7, 2013 12:00 AM at NRO

Miami, Fla. — Felix Rodriguez seems fated to be linked to Che Guevara. This is not entirely just. Rodriguez loves freedom, and has worked tirelessly for it; Guevara loved tyranny, and worked tirelessly for it. “Two sides of the same coin,” some people say. Maybe — but only in the way that light and dark are two sides of the same coin. Rodriguez had a role in stopping Guevara. He was there, in the Bolivian mountains, in 1967. He was the last person to talk with Guevara — a man who did so much to tyrannize the country where Rodriguez was born, Cuba.


The captured Che, Felix is to the left. "One, Two, many Vietnams"? 
The revo continues.

The story of Guevara’s last day has been told many times, in many ways. Rodriguez told it in his 1989 memoir, Shadow Warrior. It is told in a book published earlier this year, Daybreak at La Higuera, by Rafael Cerrato, a Spaniard. La Higuera is the village where Guevara met his end. Cerrato’s main sources for the book are Rodriguez, who was working for the Central Intelligence Agency, and Dariel Alarcón Ramírez, whose nom de guerre was Benigno. A Cuban, Benigno was Guevara’s lieutenant in Bolivia. He was also a member of Fidel Castro’s inner circle. He defected in 1996 — and now he and Rodriguez are friends.

Just a week ago, Rodriguez made a donation to the CIA Museum: ashes from Guevara’s last pipe. But he has a few more of those ashes here, in his Miami home. His den is chock-a-block with mementos. On the wall, for example, is a bond signed by José Martí, Cuba’s national hero. [If you can, go and see his equestrian statue at the head of the Avenue of the Americas at 57th St. here in NYC, in a line of these his is the most dramatic, Sherman’s, at Fifth Ave., is the most solemn] In this den, we talk about events past, present, and future. Rodriguez is an excellent talker (as well as doer). He is large, sharp, and commanding.

He was born in 1941. His hometown is Sancti Spíritus, in central Cuba. His father was a storeowner; his mother helped out in the store and tended the house. Rodriguez’s earliest memory is of being with his mom while she talked about what Hitler was doing in Europe. The little boy was scared that the Nazis would come to Cuba. Among his forebears are notable figures from Cuba’s wars of independence. One of these figures is Alejandro Rodríguez Velasco, who would become the first popularly elected mayor of Havana. In 1895, Máximo Gómez sent a letter to this man’s wife — who had asked whether her husband might come home from the field. Gómez wrote her a tender letter about the value of fighting for freedom. This letter is one of Felix Rodriguez’s treasures.

And who was Máximo Gómez? Cubans know: He was an officer from the Dominican Republic, who went to Cuba to help that country win its independence from Spain. For Cubans, he is a Lafayette. In the 1980s, Felix Rodriguez went to El Salvador, as a private citizen, to help that country defeat a Castro-backed Communist insurgency. The alias he adopted: Max Gomez. Here in his den, he reads out the letter from the original Gómez — and chokes up.

When he was about twelve, an uncle offered him the chance to study in the United States. Felix was reluctant at first, because he loved his life in Cuba. But another uncle, who had studied in Paris, said, “Think hard about this. This is a rare opportunity, and if you pass it up, you’ll regret it.” Felix heeded this advice. And he chose a school in Pennsylvania, because he wanted to see snow. The school was called Perkiomen, in Pennsburg, not far from Philadelphia. When he was a junior in high school, his country experienced its cataclysmic event: the takeover by Castro and his fellow revolutionaries. Felix’s parents were on vacation in Mexico. (It turned out to be a long vacation.) Felix, just 17, determined to fight the Communists, as soon as possible.

It was possible through something called the Anti-Communist Legion of the Caribbean, being formed in the Dominican Republic — which itself was ruled by a dictator, Trujillo. Felix joined up against his parents’ will. He arrived in Santo Domingo — or Ciudad Trujillo, as it was then — on July 4, 1959. He hoped that this date, the Fourth of July, would be as auspicious for Cubans as it had been for Americans. The Anti-Communist Legion staged just one mission into Cuba, a disaster: Castro was waiting for them, and all the troops were killed or captured. Rodriguez had been excluded from the mission at the last second. A friend of his, Roberto Martín Pérez, was captured and spent the next 28 years in Castro’s prisons. Rodriguez vowed to keep doing what he could.

One of the themes of his life is that too few people know what it is to have your country seized by totalitarians. In a 60 Minutes piece, aired in 1989, Mike Wallace asked Rodriguez why he was helping the Salvadorans. “What is it, are you a war-lover? Is that it? Are you constantly in search of adventure?” Rodriguez replied, in short, that people in general are clueless. You can read about Communism, but until you have experienced it for yourself, you have no idea. Also, there is the experience of exile: to be ripped from your country and family and friends, and not be able to return.

Many people think of Castro and his brother as Northern European–style socialists who occasionally get a little rough — or as traditional caudillos who flavor their speech with Marxism-Leninism. In reality, they are in the mold of Hoxha or Ceausescu, monsters. And the Castros’ grip on Cuba is monstrous. Like many Cubans and Cuban Americans, Rodriguez often refers to Fidel Castro simply as “he” or “him.” Equally often, he refers to him as “the son-of-a-bitch.”

At the beginning of 1961, he had an idea: He would assassinate the son-of-a-bitch. It would avoid or shorten the coming war, he reasoned. He and a friend volunteered their services — and the CIA accepted. The Agency equipped Rodriguez with a German rifle, which had a telescopic sight. The Agency also added a radio operator to the team. Three times, this team headed to Cuba on a luxurious yacht, whose captain was American and whose crew was made up of tough, hardened Ukrainians and Romanians, bearing East Bloc weapons. Rodriguez later heard that the yacht belonged to Sargent Shriver, President Kennedy’s brother-in-law. All three times, something went awry, and the Agency changed its mind about the assassination mission. In late February of ’61, Rodriguez was sent into Cuba as part of an infiltration team, whose mission was to help the Cuban resistance in advance of the invasion: an invasion that would be known as the Bay of Pigs.

Rodriguez’s mission was, of course, harrowing, with many close calls. But it was not without its amusing elements. One day, Rodriguez and a companion approached a beach. Not thinking, Rodriguez said to a militiaman, “Is it okay to use this beach or is it private?” The militiaman said, “Compañero, where you been? There aren’t any private beaches anymore. They all belong to the people!” “Oh, right,” said Rodriguez. “Thanks, compañero. Power to the Revolution!” But Rodriguez was soon warned away from a particular stretch of beach: which was marked off for Fidel Castro himself.

In his Miami den, Rodriguez gives a detailed account of the Bay of Pigs, an operation that earned the name “fiasco.” The blunders of the American planners are almost unbelievable. The Cubans had confidence until the end, says Rodriguez: America was John Wayne. And John Wayne never loses. Until he did. After the Bay of Pigs, Cuban hopes sank, and Castro cemented his power. Fear gripped the island. People shrank from resistance, understandably. Rodriguez managed to get to the Venezuelan embassy in Havana, where he was sheltered for five months: He left Cuba in September 1961. He would not be sheltered in the Venezuelan embassy today: The government in Caracas regards the Castro dictatorship as a model. Venezuelan oil helps sustain the Castro dictatorship. As Rodriguez sees it, Venezuela’s president, Nicolás Maduro, is loyal to the Castros, like a son to a father (two of them). Maduro’s predecessor, Hugo Chávez, was the same way.

Rodriguez married a Cuban girl he met when he was 14 — “It was love at first sight.” He and Rosa had two children, Rosemarie and Felix Jr. The family settled into American life — but not entirely. They were between countries, in a sense, as so many others in South Florida were. Then, in 1967, came Felix’s rendezvous with Guevara.

The old Argentinean guerrilla was in Bolivia to lead a revolution, to impose on that country what he had already helped impose on Cuba. The “old” guerrilla was 39; Rodriguez was 26. He was assigned by the CIA to assist Bolivian forces in tracking Guevara down. What was his role in ultimate success? We can say the following: Rodriguez’s skillfully gentle interrogation of a young guerrilla prisoner helped the Bolivians home in on the guerrilla leader. On October 9, Rodriguez met this leader face to face, in the mud-brick schoolhouse in La Higuera. You can imagine some of the emotion. Guevara had killed many people, personally, back in Cuba — mainly at La Cabaña, his fortress headquarters. Before they died, the Cubans shouted, “Viva Cuba libre!” (“Long live free Cuba!”) and “Viva Cristo Rey!” (“Long live Christ the King!”). And now Rodriguez had him at his feet.

Guevara was a cocky killer, but he was not so cocky at this moment. Still, he had an air of command. Said Rodriguez, “Che Guevara, I want to talk to you.” Said Guevara, “No one interrogates me.” But talk they did — about philosophy, life, and death. Rodriguez asked him about the people he killed at La Cabaña. Guevara said they were all “foreigners.” He himself had been a foreigner in Cuba, of course. And as Rodriguez pointed out to him, he was a foreigner in Bolivia. Guevara answered, “These are matters of the proletariat that are beyond your comprehension.” Rodriguez asked how he, an Argentinean physician, could have become president of the Cuban national bank. Guevara told him a funny story: One day, Castro said to his top cadres, “Who here is a dedicated economist,” or economista? Guevara thought he had said comunista — and raised his hand. That’s how he became president of the national bank. Rodriguez thought he might be kidding — but later, Benigno, the Cuban defector, confirmed the story. He had been present, sitting right next to Guevara.

Rodriguez’s orders from Washington were to do everything he could to keep Guevara alive. Then, the prisoner would be transported to Panama, to be interrogated by the Americans. But the Bolivians had the authority in this matter. It was their war, their country — and they wanted him dead. Rodriguez gave the prisoner the news. “It’s better this way, Felix,” said Guevara. “I should never have been captured alive.” Rodriguez said to him, “Comandante, do you want me to say anything to your family if I ever have the opportunity?” After an interval, Guevara said, “Yes. Tell Fidel that he will soon see a triumphant revolution in America” (i.e., South America). “And tell my wife to get remarried and try to be happy.” The two men embraced. Then Rodriguez walked out of the schoolhouse. (He was never to meet Guevara’s family.)

The Bolivian officer in charge, Joaquín Zenteno Anaya, had offered Rodriguez the chance to finish Guevara off. Guevara had done Rodriguez’s country so much harm, Zenteno said. It was only right that he have the opportunity. But he declined. It was left to a Bolivian sergeant. Rodriguez has always maintained that Guevara died with courage and dignity. He admired him for it, and still does. But that’s as far as his admiration goes.

He remembers meeting a woman some 30 years ago, whose son had been executed at La Cabaña. He was 15 years old. She went to the fortress to beg for his life. Guevara received her. This was on a Monday. He called an assistant and said, “When is this prisoner scheduled to be executed?” On Friday, he was told. The prisoner’s mother thought Guevara was going to grant a reprieve. Instead, he said, “Get him and execute him now, so his mother doesn’t have to wait until Friday.” She fainted. Says Rodriguez, “He was a very, very cruel man.”

What does he think when he sees Guevara’s face on all those T-shirts? What does he think of the people who wear those T-shirts? Mainly that they are ignorant, having no idea who Guevara was or what he did or what he stood for. One day, Benigno and his wife saw a young Frenchman in a Che shirt. His wife asked him, “Who is that fellow on your shirt?” The young man answered, “A rock singer.”

Rodriguez became an American citizen in 1969. And he volunteered for Vietnam. From 1970 to 1972, he was in special operations. He told the Vietnamese with whom he worked, “I’ve already lost my country,” meaning his original country, “but it’s not too late for you: You can fight for your country.” One Christmas, after he was back home in Miami, he received a card from a Vietnamese comrade named Hoa. “Do you think the United States will ever abandon us?” asked Hoa. Rodriguez wrote back and said no. In his view, the U.S. did in fact abandon the Vietnamese, in 1975. He is of the school that says the U.S. won the war militarily but lost it politically, and shamefully. After their triumph, the Vietnamese Communists killed about a million.

In 1976, Rodriguez left the CIA, for several reasons. One had to do with security. In May of that year, Zenteno, the Bolivian, was gunned down in Paris. He had been serving as his country’s ambassador to France. Claiming responsibility was a group that called itself the International Che Guevara Brigade. Not long after, Rodriguez received a call at home. In Spanish, a man asked for “Felix Ramos.” Then he said, “You’re next.” That name, Felix Ramos, had been Rodriguez’s alias in Bolivia. (Unlike “Max Gomez,” it had no political or historical significance.) The Agency offered to give Rodriguez and his family new identities and move them to a different state. But Rodriguez decided against: too disruptive. So, the Agency added security enhancements to his house, bullet-proofed his car, and took some other measures. They also gave him a very high award: the Intelligence Star, for valor.

For some years, the Cuban dictatorship had a price on Rodriguez’s head. From Benigno, Rodriguez learned that Raúl Castro had a special interest in him. There were at least three plots against Rodriguez. Is there still a price on his head? He thinks not: “The Cuban government has enough problems without worrying about me. But it’s always possible that some crazy guy will try to do something to congratulate himself.”

Rodriguez has a lot to say about the Carter years — none of it good — but we will skip ahead to the Reagan years. In 1985, Rodriguez went to El Salvador, as a private citizen, and as Max Gomez. He flew hundreds of combat missions with Salvadoran forces, applying what he had learned about counterinsurgency. [For those that remember the Iran-Contra hearings, he is the gentleman who spoke of his “Helicopter concept” for hunting insurgents from the air] He told the Salvadorans exactly what he had told the Vietnamese: “It may be too late for Cuba, but it’s not too late for you.” El Salvador remained out of Communist hands and took a democratic path (however stony). Like all astute observers, Rodriguez sees a general threat to Latin America today: The threat is from little Castros who are elected democratically — once. Then they go about Castroization. Rodriguez cites Evo Morales, among others: He will rule Bolivia for a very long time, presumably.

While in El Salvador, Rodriguez received a request from a White House staffer, a man soon to become famous: Oliver North. Would Rodriguez help with the resupply of the Contras in Nicaragua? They were fighting the Castro-backed, and Soviet-backed, junta in Managua. Rodriguez agreed — but fairly rapidly became disillusioned with the whole “Enterprise” (as North called it). Equipment for the Contras was shoddy and unsafe. Operational security was shaky. What really stuck in Rodriguez’s craw was war-profiteering. In 1987, he testified at the Iran-Contra hearings, without a lawyer, and without holding back. That was the end of his involvement in scandal, he thought.  

But a month later, there was an eye-popping story in the Miami Herald: A convicted money launderer for the Medellín cartel had accused Rodriguez of soliciting drug money for the Contras. This was a leak supplied by “unnamed congressional sources.” And who might they be? It was no mystery. In the Senate, John Kerry was chairing a subcommittee known to one and all as the “Kerry Committee.” He was keen to establish a link between the Contras and drug-running. He was especially keen to link the vice president, George Bush, to any such drug-running. Rodriguez had a tie to Bush, because the vice president’s national-security adviser was Donald Gregg, who had been Rodriguez’s superior in Vietnam. Rodriguez wanted to testify before Kerry’s committee in an open hearing, so he could clear his name. But Kerry insisted on a closed hearing.

Toward the end of that hearing, Rodriguez said to Kerry, “Senator, this has been the hardest testimony I ever gave in my life.” Kerry asked why. “Because,” said Rodriguez, “it is extremely difficult to have to answer questions from someone you do not respect, and I do not respect you and what you are doing here.” The senator was not pleased. “Boy, did he blow his top,” Rodriguez says. But after almost a year — and considerable Republican pressure — Kerry apologized to Rodriguez and acknowledged that the money launderer’s accusation was false. Fine, says Rodriguez. But if you Google his name, you will find plenty of references to the Medellín drug cartel. The endurance, the permanence, of the 1987 lie rankles Rodriguez. [for good or bad the interwebs are forever]

While Kerry had Rodriguez before him, he took the opportunity to question him about Che Guevara and Bolivia. For one thing, had he really done all he could to save the guerrilla’s life? Kerry was sarcastic in this questioning. It seems to Rodriguez that Kerry, at that time, had sympathy for Guevara, and the Sandinistas, and Castro. In 2004, when the senator was the presidential nominee of the Democratic party, Rodriguez spoke against him at a rally on Capitol Hill organized by Vietnam Veterans for Truth. Today, of course, Kerry is secretary of state — which pains and disgusts Rodriguez. “I despise that guy. He is a phony. He was a phony during the Vietnam War. He’s a self-promoter.” His voice trails off: “I don’t like the guy at all . . .”

Cubans such as Felix Rodriguez expected the Castro dictatorship to last a year, two years, maybe three. He was 17 when Castro took over; Castro, with his brother, still rules the island, and Rodriguez is 72. Communism in Cuba has lasted longer than Communism in Eastern Europe, by ten years and counting. Obviously, this is more painful and disgusting to Rodriguez than John Kerry’s current status as U.S. secretary of state. Cuba was no Jeffersonian democracy when Castro took over. But it was nothing like the totalitarian hell he and his partners made it. And it has had no chance to evolve in a democratic direction, as the Dominican Republic and lots of other places did. When will it end? When will the Communists fall? Cubans are weary of answering this question, after almost 55 years. Rodriguez, though, points to the Castros’ friends in Venezuela: If the oil ever stopped coming, the brothers would be in trouble. Needless to say, Rodriguez is unsure whether he will see Cuba again.

Twenty-five years ago, he wrote in his memoir, “Sometimes I feel a little bit like Ulysses. . . . Like him, I am from an island nation. Like him, I went to war. And like him, I am having a hard time getting home.” How about today? Does he still feel that way? Is he still trying to get home? Where’s home? “It’s complicated,” Rodriguez says. Yes, it is. It is complicated for virtually all Cuban Americans of his generation. Rodriguez is a patriotic Cuban. He is also a patriotic American. Under normal circumstances, this would be a bald contradiction, but the circumstances of the Cuban exile are peculiar, not normal. Rodriguez says that the Cuba he knew has been destroyed, over these 50-plus years. He doesn’t know anyone over there anymore. The Communists long ago expropriated his family home in Sancti Spíritus. If the regime fell, he wouldn’t claim it. But he might like to negotiate to buy it, “for sentimental reasons.”

The 60 Minutes piece done on him in 1989 is an exercise in soft-Left condescension. It portrays anti-Communism as some kind of mental disorder, or at least a sign of immaturity. Of Rodriguez, Mike Wallace says, “He has never lost his love of war nor his anti-Communist ideals.” Rodriguez doesn’t love war: But he is willing to fight in order to keep or gain freedom and peace. At the end of the segment, Wallace wonders, “What does the future hold for this 48-year-old foot soldier in a fading Cold War?” Arthur Liman, who was chief counsel to the Iran-Contra Committee, says, “I think that Felix Rodriguez will probably end up — and I hate to say this — in an unmarked grave in some faraway place, fighting the remnants of Communism.” Wallace responds, “A little bit like Che Guevara.”


William F. Buckley Jr. once came up with a formulation: Say that Smith pushes an old lady out of the way of an onrushing bus. Then Jones pushes an old lady into the way of an onrushing bus. It would be absurd to say that these are two men who push old ladies around. Felix Rodriguez will always be linked to Che Guevara, and they both fought. But they are not alike. Rodriguez’s face will probably not grace a T-shirt. He is what they call a “right-wing Cuban exile.” Guevara is a “romantic revolutionary” and “idealist.” His face sits on a billion T-shirts. Pilgrims flock to La Higuera, to worship at his shrine there. But of the two men, Rodriguez and Guevara, only one deserves honor.
All Eyes on North Korea

Bryce and Edith M. Bowmar professor in humanistic studies, Cornell University
member, military history working group

From the Strategika page at The Hoover Institution



US 2518, Hoover Institution Archives poster collection

North Korea is a peculiar place but it should not be considered in isolation. Although a small state, it takes part in regional relationships that go far back in history and in global networks of more recent vintage but great consequence. But what precisely is North Korea?

At first blush, North Korea looks like Sparta with nuclear weapons. Like Sparta it is a garrison state–communistic, militaristic, austere, isolated, secretive, totalitarian (much more efficiently so than its ancient counterpart), and often brutal to its own inhabitants. True, North Korea does not have helots, as Sparta’s large population of serfs was called, but it does have prison camps and national priorities that put guns very far ahead of butter. Famine devastated North Korea in the 1990s, killing perhaps two million people or ten per cent of the population. Although the worst is over, reports of micro-famine and even cannibalism persist.

On second thought, the analogy is imperfect because Sparta was a constitutional monarchy offering a degree of political freedom to its citizen elite. Observers disagree as to whether North Korea is best characterized as communist, fascist or nationalist, but one thing is clear: since its founding in 1948, North Korea has been a hereditary dictatorship run by one family. Kim Il-sung (r. 1948-1994), known as the “Great Leader” and “Eternal President,” his son Kim Jong-il (r. 1994-2011), known as the “Dear Leader” and “Supreme Leader,” and his grandson Kim Jong-un (r. 2011-present), another “Supreme Leader,” have been the sole rulers as well as the objects of a massive cult of personality. Sparta preferred gray, company men.

A pirate state may be a better analogy. Like pirates, North Korea engages in crime–in its case, blackmail [not to mention counterfeiting, and drug and human trafficking]. It uses the threat of nuclear weapons to get the outside world to provide the food and aid that it needs to keep going. Yet North Korea does not engage in a thoroughgoing war, let alone nuclear war, because that would end the game. Ancient Mediterranean pirates hated Rome but knew enough not to enrage it by helping the rebel gladiator Spartacus when he came calling. So too North Korea knows enough to limit its provocations. It learned its lesson from the Korean War (1950-1953), a North Korean invasion of South Korea that led to ruin.

Kim Il-sung promised Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin a great victory if Stalin unleashed him. Since 1945, when Japan’s colonial empire collapsed, Korea was divided into two occupation zones at the 38th parallel. The Soviets occupied the northern zone and the Americans the southern zone. Lines hardened during the Cold War. In 1948 the United Nations supervised elections that set up two separate governments: the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the north and the Republic of Korea in the south. Each side aimed at reunifying the peninsula and extending its control to the other half. The year 1949 saw border skirmishes followed by heavy fighting along the 38th parallel but neither side was strong enough to conquer the other and both were restrained by their respective hegemons.

Then, in 1950, the Soviets changed their mind. After the victory of the Chinese Communists in 1949, the Americans decided to withdraw from the Asian mainland and to build instead a defense perimeter in Japan, the Philippines, and other Pacific islands. Along with other factors such as the creation of NATO in April 1949 and the Soviet atom bomb in July 1949, American withdrawal convinced the Soviets to allow North Korea’s leader, Kim Il-Sung, to invade the south.

The war that followed did not go as planned. Before the Korean War was over, both the Americans and Chinese sent massive numbers of ground troops to Korea while the Soviets and Americans fought an air war over North Korea. The North nearly conquered the South–twice. The Americans were nearly driven off the peninsula–twice. The Americans conquered North Korea before the Chinese drove them out in turn. Much of the 85,000-square-mile peninsula was devastated. Nearly 3 million people, soldiers and civilians, were killed, wounded, or went missing. In the end, the peninsula continued to be divided on only slightly different lines as before.

Since then, North Korea has continued to behave violently but in measured doses. It has attempted to assassinate several South Korean leaders [it succeeded with the mother of the present President of the ROK], tunneled under the Demilitarized Zone that separates the two states, bombed a South Korean civilian airliner, [sank a ROK frigate] and shelled a South Korean island. Armed to the teeth, it threatens the heart of South Korea without actually attacking it. The southern capital, Seoul, lies 35 miles south of the DMZ, about the distance of Palo Alto from San Francisco. The Seoul metropolitan area is not only South Korea’s largest, but also home to half of the country’s population.

As far as the United States, North Korea has, over the years, axe-murdered two American officers in the DMZ and boarded the USS Pueblo, an American ship that it claimed had entered its waters, and then held the crew hostage under tough conditions for nearly a year. In commemoration of the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the Korean War this year, the North has stepped up threats and bluster.

And then, there is the North Korean weapons program. After conducting three nuclear tests, North Korea is widely thought to have a small stockpile of nuclear weapons. It is also thought to have chemical weapons. North Korea has an extensive ballistic missile program that can reach South Korea and Japan and, according to North Korean claims, continental North America as well [though their three stage missiles tend to break up over the Pacific]. American intelligence agencies are divided as to the truth of the claim, although the U.S. government is playing it safe by deploying more missile interceptors on the West Coast.

Intelligence officials also debate whether North Korea has mastered the technology of delivering any nuclear weapons by ballistic missile at all. But most expect that it will achieve that capability within five-ten years.

Nor does anyone doubt that North Korea sets a very bad example for a world that does not want to see nuclear weapons proliferate. Pakistan helped North Korea develop its nuclear weapons program. North Korea exports ballistic missiles widely to such countries as Pakistan, Iran, Syria, Egypt, and Vietnam.

What then, is North Korea’s piracy all about? It aims at regime survival, certainly; a sense of power and importance, no doubt; and an attempt to move toward long-cherished regional goals as well as to settle scores. The nuclear weapons program is an insurance policy against all outsiders. It gains the attention of China and the United States, both of which are concerned about nuclear armament by Japan and South Korea in response to the North. North Korea’s nuclear program might lead to war with the South and to a far broader conflict.

North Korea is twinned, of course, with South Korea. The two Koreas were unified for well over a thousand years before their division in 1945 and most Koreans consider the division of the peninsula unnatural. North Korea makes no bones about its desire to conquer the South and reunify the peninsula. As for the United States, the North considers it Enemy Number One, ever since the American invasion and air bombing campaign of the Korean War–not to mention the North’s anti-capitalist ideology. Yet the Korean peninsula is in turn a piece of a larger puzzle, that of Northeast Asia–or perhaps it is the lynch-pin.

Korea owns one of the world’s most strategic and vulnerable locations. Like Poland, it is a medium-sized country that lies between great powers. Korea is a land bridge between China and Russia to the north and Japan to the south, which is separated from Korea by a strait only 120 miles wide. Over the centuries, invaders have attacked Korea from both directions, exploiting a vulnerability summed up by the Korean proverb that “when whales fight, the shrimp’s back breaks.” Japanese have called Korea “a dagger pointed at Japan” and Mao Zedong referred to Korea as “the lips to China’s teeth.”1 In recent years the United States has played a big part in Korean affairs as well. China and Japan loomed large in Korean affairs far earlier, and before Russian power arose in northern Asia, the Mongols and Manchus rode in from the north and conquered Korea.

China is historically Korea’s most important relation. China shaped many states lying on its periphery but none more so than Korea. For centuries, Korea was China’s closest client state but also the most successful manager of its patron. North Korea’s relationship with China is, if anything, more important than that of most Korean states in history. A massive infusion of Chinese ground troops saved North Korea from American invasion during the Korean War. The Soviet Union, to be sure, was North Korea’s chief patron, but since the end of the USSR, China has been the most important ally.

And that brings up what may be the most peculiar thing about North Korea of all. Much of North Korea’s leverage comes from the threat not of attack but of collapse. China fears that without foreign aid, North Korea will implode. The result will be a huge humanitarian, economic, and political problem. Many South Koreans feel similarly. They long for Korean reunification and they dread it. Many fear that the cost paid by West Germany for reintegrating East Germany would be minor compared to the cost of rebuilding the wreck that is North Korea.

One thing is certain. With its history, its ambition, its policies, its regional importance, and its international connections and repercussions, North Korea will keep the world’s attention.


1. David McCann and Barry S. Strauss, eds., War and Democracy: A Comparative Study of the Korean War and the Peloponnesian War (M. E. Sharpe, 2001), intro, p. 17 + xxviii n. 10.