Deposing Morsi Won’t End the Chronic
Rejection of Secularism in Egypt
July 6th, 2013 by Andrew Bostom |
at AndrewBostom.org
What the late P.J. Vatikiotis left for
Egypt delusionists of all ilks, past and present, to learn:
The [1923] constitution itself
proclaimed Islam as the official religion of the state, inevitably undermining
its other provisions relating to the rights of citizens such as freedom of
worship or belief, speech, and so forth…Until a secular formula of identity and
social cohesiveness is found that is acceptable, the religious or traditional
one will dominate the social order. And to this extent the question of religion
and state will remain unresolved. But that will require a commitment on the
part of the leadership to remove religion from the public realm altogether and
relegate it to the realm of private belief. However, as long as it insists on
identifying itself with the theoretical unity of the umma, the Islamic
community, it will always suffer the consequences of the fusion, real or
assumed, between sanctity and power
**
The late, brilliant political scientist, P.J. Vatikiotis (d.
1997), educated at the American University in Cairo, Egypt, and author of
many important analyses of Egyptian socio-political history, opened his
seminal 1981 study, “Religion
and State,” with these words:
“Religion and State” is not a new
preoccupation in the study of Egyptian or any other society where the faith of
Islam predominates.
Vatikiotis adds that
this “difficult and largely unresolved problem”—present since the 7th century
advent of Islam—derived from, and continued to manifest, in Egypt, the
…curious “marriage” between a universal
religious truth or message and an otherwise very parochial community that held
it and fought for it or in its name
Three decades later, despite widespread euphoria
regarding the mass
movement which
prompted a military
coup deposing
Egypt’s first popularly-elected President, Muhammad Morsi, and his coterie of
Muslim Brotherhood ideologues, the ancient-cum-modern conundrum elucidated by
Vatikiotis, remains tragically unresolved within this Muslim-dominant society.
Vatikiotis’ sobering and remarkably compendious 1981 analysis also explodes
the instantly
manufactured (and popularized)
canard that Morsi’s ouster somehow “discredited
and marginalized Islamism”—a chimerical Western construct invented to
avoid dealing forthrightly with mainstream, traditionalist Islam, and its
votaries in Egypt, and beyond.
Moreover, across the political, ideological, and
cultural spectrum a broad consensus has emerged that Egypt’s dire economic status—exacerbated
demonstrably under Morsi’s brief, inept stewardship—was
the overriding motivation for the removal of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood
President, and his administration. Millers and bakers in Egypt, the world’s
largest wheat-importing nation, recently warned imported
international wheat stocks had “sunk to levels that could reduce the
availability of the flour they need to produce bread of an acceptable
quality.” One-quarter of
Egyptians live below the poverty limit of $1.65 a day, with millions dependent on
bread loaves that sell for a state-regulated price of less than 1 U.S. cent per
loaf—held constant since 1989, and one-seventh of actual present costs. Egypt’s
currency crisis has hindered the
Supply Ministry’s ability to make timely payments to the millers, and in April,
Morsi failed to
secure grain, and a loan from Russia (one of Egypt’s main suppliers of grain)
worsening the already dire economic crisis. Egypt’s persistent economic woes
have resulted in
widespread malnutrition, stunting the growth of 40% of its population, and
afflicting the impoverished nation with added healthcare and educational costs,
as well as decreased human productivity.
Friday, 7/5/13, alone, in the aftermath of the coup
which toppled Morsi, internecine clashes between pro-Morsi and anti-Morsi
Egyptian Muslim groups (along with predatory
Muslim violence targeting Coptic Christians),
killed 46 people, and wounded 1404, according to a local (Al-Hayat) television
report. Understandably, such chaotic violence has inspired
prevalent sentiments akin to those expressed by
Cairene Headwaiter Attef Abdelghalil. Interviewed by Der
Spiegel following the coup, Abdelghalil acknowledged
that he and most of the staff at perhaps Cairo’s best known teahouse, Café
el-Fishawy, had voted for the Muslim Brotherhood due to their perceived honesty
and reliability, after 30-years of kleptocratic rule under Mubarak. Now, in the
wake of the economic failure wrought by Muslim Brotherhood governance under
Morsi, Abdelghalil has no
confidence in the “anti-Morsi opposition,” either—or
“democracy” itself.
The army should not be in a rush to give
up power. Democracy isn’t important at the moment. Only the economy
matters. Currently, all we have is chaos. It has to end.
Abdelghalil concluded by
arguing that new elections be delayed for 3-years. But Egypt’s interim military
caretaker rulers, and their appointed minions, will likely
orchestrate a considerably more rapid timetable for drafting a revised
Constitution, and holding new Parliamentary and Presidential elections. There
seems to be little
appetite within the military to govern directly given
management errors which occurred during the transitional military rule
following Mubarak’s sacking in 2011, till Morsi’s election in 2012.
Transitional military rule then was punctuated by
abusive custody of civilians, their trial in military courts, worsening crime,
and economic stagnation, resulting in public ire directed at the governing
generals.
Regardless of the length of transitional military
rule, the hopes of some indeterminate—but clearly small—minority of anti-Morsi
Egyptians who might favor truly secular rule, remain a pipe dream. General
el-Sissi himself, who is overseeing Egypt’s post-Morsi transition, reflects a
predominant anti-secular mindset which persists among the Egyptian populace despite
the brief, inept experiment in more overtly theocratic Muslim Brotherhood
“statecraft.” Robert
Springborg, a Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterrey California, recognized for his published expertise on the Egyptian
military, notes
el-Sissi is a pious Muslim, whose wife is believed to don the full-body
covering niqab. According to Springborg, “Islamic
ideology penetrates Sisi’s thinking about political and security matters.” Springborg adds,
pointedly, that el-Sissi’s devout traditionalist Muslim Weltanschauung—his
global “framework,” is the Sharia-supremacist “project.”
The Egyptian general hasn't abandoned that endeavor, nor does he wish to see it
“destroyed” due to Brotherhood mishandling. El-Sissi, Springborg writes,
clings tenaciously to the
…idea that Islam should be a very
important consideration in Egyptian national security policy, but this is not
the way it’s done…Sissi probably feels to some extent betrayed by Mursi and the
Brothers who have mishandled things so badly.
A public gesture consistent with these still
prevailing Sharia supremacist sentiments was the demand by Al Azhar Grand Imam
Ahmed al-Tayeb, during a
televised national address, for release of “prisoners of conscience”—his
characterization of several leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, placed under
arrest. Clearly, however, the most valid—and irrefragable—evidence of Egypt’s
overwhelming, vox populi Sharia supremacist
views derives from the published findings of independent polls based
on face-to-face interviews with large, population-based samples of Egyptians.
These data reveal that 74% of Egyptian Muslims supported making Sharia the
official state law of their society; 70% favored Sharia-based mandatory
(“hadd”)
punishments “like whippings
and cutting off of hands for crimes like theft and
robbery”; 80% supported the hadd punishment of stoning for
adultery; 88% favored the hadd punishment of execution for
“apostasy,” while 67%
desired to re-create the transnational
Caliphate—whose goal is the universal application of Sharia
via bellicose jihad
conquests. Lastly, at present, as opposed to a merely
“aspirational” goal of Sharia supremacism, female genital mutilation (FGM)
is sanctioned by
the predominant Shafiite school of Islamic law in Egypt, leading to current
rates of this misogynistc
barbarity among Egyptian
women of 95%.
Vatikiotis lucidly
chronicled Egypt’s 150-year experience (through 1981) of
failed experiments with secularization imposed by forceful despots, beginning
in the 1820's with Muhammad Ali (and including his equally “vigorous” grandson,
Khedive Ismail). The process reached its apogee with the adoption of a
constitutional parliamentary system in 1923. However, as Vatikiotis observes,
the “very small group” attempting to impose this “borrowed secularism” never
tried to resolve the contradiction between their adopted foreign ideology and
“the native religious tradition.” Worse still, a more fundamental defect in the
process emerged, which, unresolved ever since, continues to plague Egyptian
society, engendering sectarian violence against the non-Muslim minority
Christian (primarily Coptic) population, and bloody internecine conflicts
between members of Egypt’s dominant Muslim majority.
Neither authority nor the source of law,
despite all the state-promulgated and decreed legislation, was clearly divorced
from its ultimate divine source and sanction. The constitution itself
proclaimed Islam as the official religion of the state, inevitably undermining
its other provisions relating to the rights of citizens such as freedom of
worship or belief, speech, and so forth. Thus, such a provision was
fundamentally contrary to the conception of a secular state because under the
constitution the latter still sought and recognized a legitimacy based on
divine sanction. The transcendent reference for authority and political power
remained partly divine and not purely secular. The uniformity of individual
citizen rights therefore remained unattainable.…[T]he more fundamental problem
of the relation between religion and state remained unresolved. It was put in
abeyance only to return to plague the Egyptian body politic. A concept of
citizenship based on a clearly secular idea of identity for the individual and
the society did not materialize, and the alienation of both from the state
persisted.
Vatikiotis added,
rather presciently 30-years ago, considering the dissolution of Egypt’s recently
approved Constitution (a more overtly Sharia supremacist
document than its now “halcyon”
1923 antecedent), which accompanied President Morsi’s
removal from power:
The absence of a constitution or its
precarious state is a measure of the difficulties. As long as Egypt has no
political order that is clearly based on a secular consensus, it will remain
afflicted by religious and communal antagonisms. Depending on the ability of
the state to satisfy the economic and other needs of its public, these
antagonisms, though usually muted or subterranean, will surface periodically.
Until a secular formula of identity and social cohesiveness is found that is
acceptable, the religious or traditional one will dominate the social order.
And to this extent the question of religion and state will remain
unresolved. But that will require a commitment on the part of the
leadership to remove religion from the public realm altogether and relegate it
to the realm of private belief. However, as long as it insists on identifying
itself with the theoretical unity of the umma, the Islamic community, it will
always suffer the consequences of the fusion, real or assumed, between sanctity
and power…[T]he Egyptian state, more than any of its [Arab Muslim]
neighbors, has over the last 150 years tried to control, loosen, manipulate,
and exploit the relation between religion and politics. But it has done that at
the expense of a clear, unequivocal option for a secular polity.
A native Arabic-speaking Middle Easterner, educated
in Egypt, and sympathetic to the country’s chronic predicament, Vatikiotis nevertheless proffered a
concluding unapologetic argument about the roots of Egypt’s inability to emerge
as a freedom-embracing, tolerant, pluralistic society. Uninformed delusionists
of all ilks—including, notably, former President George W. Bush, as gauged by
these remarks,
recorded July 2, 2013—would be wise to heed Vatikiotis’
words:
It may be of course, that a secular
political order is the peculiar, nay singular, product of a particular
political culture, the ethical, philosophical, and moral basis which lay in
ancient Greek science and rationalism and Roman law and humanism, rediscovered
and developed further by the Renaissance, and the institutional basis of which
lay in European feudalism in the Middle Ages. Yet its final consecration
occurred with a specific philosophical and institutional commitment in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. None of these foundations seems to exist
in Muslim societies, including the Egyptian. Their antecedents rejected
classical rationalism and humanism, and their more recent precursors simply
superimposed a veneer of secularism on the state in an emulative way.
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